UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL AUTÓNOMA DE MÉXICO
PROGRAMA DE POSGRADO EN FILOSOFÍA DE LA CIENCIA

Actividad Académica: Seminario					
Clave: /	**Semestre:** 2018-1 (Fall 2017)	**Campo de conocimiento:** Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Philosophy of Mind			
Carácter: Obligatoria ( ) Optativa ( ) de Elección ( )		**Horas por semana**		**Horas al semestre**	**No. Créditos:**
Tipo:		**Teóricas:**	**Prácticas:**		
		4		64	8
Modalidad: Presencial		**Duración del programa: 1 semestre**			

Seriación: Si ( ) No (x) Obligatoria (x) Indicativa ( )

TÍTULO DEL CURSO: Action and Perception

Imparte: Stefano Giuseppe Vincini

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Día y hora del curso o seminario (dos propuestas):

Wednesdays, 16:00-20:00 pm
Tuesdays, 16:00-20:00 pm

Place: Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas (IIFs)

Introducción:

In this course, we will investigate the nature of action and perception and the relationship between the two. Some of the questions we will deal with are: Is perception possible without action? How does perception induce action? How do we experience our own actions and how do we perceive the actions of others? How does action production affect action perception? How does imitation work? What does imitation tell us about human nature? What is the relationship between action, the will, and the self?

Objetivo general:

The general goal is to come to appreciate a specific way of doing Philosophy of Cognitive Science and of approaching Philosophy of Mind. Students will study the empirical literature in detail and will get to know issues vividly debated by cognitive scientists. Thus, on one side, students will experience how a detailed knowledge of scientific findings and theories helps address traditional philosophical questions. On the other side, students will have the occasion to notice how philosophy can help interpret cognitive-scientific findings and even contribute to the progress of empirical knowledge.

Objetivos específicos:

Students will become familiar with: (a) the enactivist theory of the relationship between perception and action; (b) the ideomotor/common coding theory of action modulation through perception; (c) phenomenological analyses of action, attention, passive affective phenomena, and perception (e.g. how to tackle the question of the structural differences between the experience of action and the experience of being passively affected); (d) different types of imitation and different explanations for imitation; (e) the extent to which basic cognitive processes (e.g. association) may be used to explain human coordination and interaction; (f) different interpretations of mirror neurons and their developmental origins.

Contenido Temático			
Unidad	Temas	Horas	
		Teóricas	Prácticas
1	Phenomenology of Action	8	
2	Enactivism	16	
3	Ideomotor Theory and Imitation	24	
4	Mirror Neurons	16	
	Total de horas:	64	
	Suma total de horas:	64	

Bibliografía:

Main texts (for some of the texts below, students will have to read only selected parts):

Noë, A. (2004). *Action in perception*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Prinz, W. (2012). *Open Minds: The social making of agency and intentionality*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Ricoeur, P. (1966). *Freedom and nature: The voluntary and the involuntary*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

Ferrari, P.F. & Rizzolatti, G. (2015). *New frontiers in mirror neurons research*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Complementary:

Cook, R., Bird, G., Catmur, C., Press, C., & Heyes, C. (2014). Mirror neurons: From origin to function. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 37(2), 177-192.

Chartrand, T.L., Bargh, J., 1999. The chameleon effect. *J. Pers. Soc. Psychol.*, *76*(6), 893–910.

Chartrand, T.L., Maddux, W.W., Lakin, J.L., 2005. Beyond the perception-behaviorlink: the ubiquitous utility and motivational moderators of nonconscious mimicry. *The New Unconscious*, 334–361.

David, N., Newen, A., Vogeley, K. (2008). The ‘‘sense of agency” and its underlying cognitive and neural mechanisms. *Consciousness and Cognition*, 17, 523–534.

Hommel, B., & Elsner, B. (2009). Acquisition, representation, and control of action. In E. Morsella, J. A. Bargh, & P. M. Gollwitzer (eds.), *Oxford handbook of human action* (pp. 371-398). New York: Oxford University Press.

Pacherie, E. (2008). The phenomenology of action: A conceptual framework. *Cognition*, 107, 179–217.

Prinz, J. (2012) Waiting for the Self. In J. Liu & J. Perry (eds.), *Consciousness and the Self* (pp. 123–49). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Prinz, W. (1990). A common coding approach to perception and action. In O. Neumann & W. Prinz (Eds.), *Relationships between perception and action: Current approaches* (pp. 167–201). Berlin, Germany: Springer.

Prinz, W. (1997). Perception and action planning. *European Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 9*, 129–154.

Prinz, W. (2005). An ideomotor approach to imitation. In S. Hurley & N. Chater (Eds.), *Perspectives on imitation* (Vol. 1, pp. 141-156). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Medios didácticas:	**Métodos de evaluación:**
Exposición profesor(a) (X) Exposición alumnos (X) Ejercicios dentro de clase ( ) Ejercicios fuera del aula ( ) Lecturas obligatorias (X) Trabajo de investigación (X) Prácticas de campo ( ) Otros: _____ ( )	Exámenes o trabajos parciales ( ) Examen o trabajo final escrito (X) Trabajos y tareas fuera del aula ( ) Exposición de alumnos (X) Participación en clase (X) Asistencia ( ) Prácticas ( ) Otros: _____( )

Evaluación y forma de trabajo

Evaluation (grade weighting):

1. Participation 20%
2. Student Presentations 50%
3. Final paper 30%